

## TOWARD UNDERSTANDING *ΚΑΤΑΣΤΕΛΩ* (EUR. *IA* 934)

August Heinrich Matthiae was the first to cast suspicions upon the MS reading *καταστέλω* in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* (934) by emending it to *καταστένω*.<sup>1</sup> The line occurs in a passage to which most scholars deny a Euripidean pedigree, while the meaning of the word itself has been deemed questionable. Issues of authorship aside, this note seeks to situate the word *καταστέλω* as the appropriate reading of the line through an analysis of the staging of the scene in the third episode. *Καταστέλω* may not have been written by Euripides, but it plays a vital role in the scene.

In the third episode, Clytemnestra sinks to her knees before Achilles. Although the audience sees her action, she describes what she is doing: 'I will not be ashamed to fall down at your knees' (900). Action visualizes, and words highlight, her desperate need for Achilles' aid in resisting her husband, Agamemnon. The scene effectively illustrates Oliver Taplin's principle for reading tragedy: 'if an action is significant, then it does not go unnoticed'.<sup>2</sup>

E.B. England attributes lines 933–4 to an interpolator. He has doubts about line 933, ἂ δὲ κατ' ἄνδρα γίγνεται νεανίαν: 'Why should a young man be deemed naturally poor in pity?' and about the phrase *περιβαλὼν καταστέλω* in 934: 'whatever he [the interpolator] meant by it'.<sup>3</sup> England translates *περιβαλὼν* as 'I will wrap you around in, enfold you in', and distinguishes between two translations for *καταστέλω* σε, holding that it means 'at most ... I will set you to rights, not I will right you'. In preferring one meaning to the other, he passes over the ambiguity of *καταστέλω* – both translations pertain – and its function as a stage direction.

The central fact remains that, whoever wrote the σε ... *περιβαλὼν καταστέλω*, the words describe what is happening on stage. Thanks to the emendation, the text appears to be silent about Clytemnestra's rising to her feet. Yet at some point Clytemnestra must rise, since she exits the scene by walking to the *skênê*.<sup>4</sup> Achilles has been moved to pity as much as the haughty and callow youth can be. He envelops the kneeling woman by throwing his arms about her and guiding her to her feet. He sets Clytemnestra aright, that is, back on her feet, restoring her to the dignity as wife and mother she displayed in her entrance (607–30) and will bring against her husband in the next scene (1146–1208). Achilles' action, significant as a way to show his reaction to her plea, is thus marked by lines 933–4, *καταστέλω*, and the words that accompany it provide the expected textual recognition. In short, they satisfy Taplin's dictum.

Failure to appreciate *καταστέλω* as a stage direction surely led to emendation, the infelicitous *καταστένω*, 'I lament'. Achilles does not proceed to mourn Iphigenia. She is not dead, and to lament her would be ill omened. In any case, mourning is the task of women. He remains within the realm of men and states his intention to defend

<sup>1</sup> J. Diggle, *Euripidis Fabulae*. Vol. 3: *Helena, Phoenissae, Orestes, Bacchae, Iphigenia Aulidensis, Rhesus* (Oxford, 1994), 395. Diggle retains *καταστέλω*, while D. Kovacs, *Euripides: Bacchae, Iphigenia at Aulis, Rhesus* (Cambridge, MA and London, 2002), 270 accepts *καταστένω*. Kovacs gives a direction for Clytemnestra entering from the *skênê* (after line 1097) but none for her rising to her feet.

<sup>2</sup> O. Taplin, *Stagecraft of Aeschylus. The Dramatic Use of Exits and Entrances in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford, 1977), 30.

<sup>3</sup> E.B. England, *The Iphigenia at Aulis of Euripides* (New York, 1891), 94–5.

<sup>4</sup> Clytemnestra enters from the *skênê* for the fourth episode (1098), so she must have exited to it at the end of the third episode.

Iphigenia as his once-prospective bride: 'Never will your daughter be slaughtered by her father since she was called mine' (935–6). He dwells upon the insult to his honour and the wrongful appropriation of his name (938–69). Then he calls his sword to witness, in words that leave no doubt as to intent:

I will smear my sword with stains of barbarian blood,  
if someone will deprive me of your daughter. (971–2)

The sword, no longer merely a prop for the actor playing a soldier, becomes the focus of Achilles' conflict with Agamemnon. It visualizes Achilles' intention not to mourn, not to 'lament', but rather to set things right for Clytemnestra, Iphigenia and himself in the way of a warrior more readily disposed to violence than to pity.

Achilles' speech argues vigorously for the reading *καταστέλω* in order to restore not only its meaning but also the telling stage direction contained in that word.

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## *EIPΩNEIA* IN ARISTOPHANES AND PLATO

### I. INTRODUCTION

Otto Ribbeck's 'Über den Begriff des *εἰρων*' of 1876 is the point of departure for modern studies of *εἰρωνεία* in Graeco-Roman antiquity.<sup>1</sup> Ribbeck engaged the topic in the course of research into Theophrastus' characters. His aim was to provide a background in terms of which to understand Theophrastus' *εἰρων*. Ribbeck's article begins with the earliest surviving occurrences of the word, in Aristophanes, and suggests that it is there used as a vulgar term of insult meaning 'liar'. It is argued that the same sense occurs throughout Plato, where chronologically the next cluster of cognate instances occurs.

Most recently, Melissa Lane's 'The evolution of *eirōneia* in classical Greek texts: why Socratic *eirōneia* is not Socratic irony' largely confirms Ribbeck's conclusion.<sup>2</sup> Lane argues that *εἰρωνεία* means 'deception' or 'concealing by feigning'.<sup>3</sup> She also emphasizes that, in contrast, irony, precisely verbal irony, is 'saying something with the intent that the message is understood as conveying the opposite or an otherwise different meaning'.<sup>4</sup> For example, a museum patron mocks a hideous painting by calling it gorgeous. Thus, in the case of *εἰρωνεία*, success implies that the intended audience believes what the *εἰρων* literally says, whereas in the case of irony, success implies that the intended audience does not believe what the ironist literally says. Consequently, *εἰρωνεία* should never be translated as 'irony', and Socratic *εἰρωνεία*, to the extent that it exists, is not Socratic irony, to the extent that that exists.

<sup>1</sup> *RhM* 31 (1876), 381–400. See also Wilhelm Büchner, 'Über den Begriff der Eironeia', *Hermes* 76 (1941), 339–58 and Lief Bergson, 'Eiron und Eironeia', *Hermes* 99 (1971) 407–22, as well as the bibliography in David Wolfsdorf, 'The Irony of Socrates,' *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 65 (2007), 175–87, and in Melissa Lane's article, cited in the following note.

<sup>2</sup> *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 31 (2006), 49–83.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 53.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* 49.